The lazy West and the war in Ukraine

As geopolitical tides shift and threats loom larger, the West finds itself at a crossroads: will it rally to Ukraine’s defense, or succumb to complacency as the conflict intensifies? With uncertainty gripping the region, the world watches with bated breath for the West’s next move.

Europe’s stance towards Russia in security discussions is poised to shift towards a more constructive trajectory as Russian military forces draw closer to the eastern EU states bordering Ukraine,” recently prognosticated Konstantin Gavrilov, a prominent Russian diplomat engaged in permanent arms limitation talks in Vienna. He suggested that tensions would abate once Russian troops positioned themselves along the borders of Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia, anticipating a notable change in tone.

Similar sentiments have echoed from various quarters, predominantly from figures like the former Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. However, current sentiments no longer extend a welcoming hand to such ‘runaway fools’. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine serves as a glaring testament to the weight of Soviet imperial ambitions lingering within the regime.

While the myth of Russian military invincibility crumbles before our eyes, the world increasingly lends credence to the grand pronouncements of these talking heads. Medvedev’s recent lecture, wherein he depicted Ukraine as reduced to a narrow strip of territory bordering Poland, Romania, and Hungary, exemplifies this narrative. Tamás Varga Csiki, a senior research fellow at the Strategic Defence Research Institute (SVKI) of the National University of Public Service, affirms the presence of Russian intentions. There seems to be no indication of a mutual realization that goals are unattainable, rendering further pursuit of the conflict futile. Moreover, prospects for de-escalation appear dim: Putin’s abrogation of five international agreements safeguarding Ukraine’s security two years ago raises doubts about his commitment to any prospective peace accord. Consequently, the European Union, NATO members, and their allies must brace themselves for a protracted threat even in the absence of active warfare.

Awaiting Military Investments

However, the European Union seems to have slumbered amidst this brewing crisis. Apart from the conflict in southern Slavia, the bloc has not grappled with a genuine war scenario for almost eight decades. Despite the palpable threat posed by Russia and the EU’s sluggish response, the Community’s war machinery struggles to mobilize. National armies stand depleted, with German stockpiles, for instance, lasting a mere three days. Promised military aid, such as the one million rounds of artillery ammunition pledged to Ukraine, languishes beyond the grasp of the democratic world for months. The Czech government’s revelation of ‘discovering’ 800,000 artillery shells, facilitated by funds from Canadian sources and others, offers some respite. However, initiatives like Germany’s recent announcement of Rheinmetall’s construction of a new ammunition factory merely scratch the surface of addressing the crisis. The facility, slated to commence operations in a year, aims to produce 200,000 rounds of artillery ammunition annually, alongside explosives, rocket launchers, and other essential components. While the estimated construction cost of €300 million is considerable, it falls short of the necessary investment.

The European defense industry’s decline over the past two to three decades prompted a belated decision to revitalize it in response to Russian aggression. However, the journey ahead is arduous, with a mere €2.4 billion earmarked from the 2023 common budget for military development. Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, pledges a more robust commitment to defense industrial production, promising an increase of over 20 percent. Last year witnessed a 20 percent surge in military production, with further growth anticipated. Von der Leyen’s re-election campaign includes integrating funding for armaments programs into the common EU budget, emphasizing joint procurement and prioritizing EU manufacturers. Yet, this proposition faces resistance, as defense funding currently falls under individual EU governments’ purview. In January, the Commission and the European Investment Fund unveiled a €175 million plan to bolster the defense industry’s innovation, complemented by an additional €1.5 billion from the STEP program for innovation and development. However, a Franco-German dispute currently stalls the allocation of an additional €5 billion to the European Peace Facility (EPF) and the establishment of a similar fund for Ukraine.

Challenges of Collective Action

Beyond the absence of a common defense industry and budget, the EU’s inability to foster coordinated military development underscores its current impotence. According to Varga Csiki, the EU lacks the cohesion required to forge a unified military force with synchronized defense and operational planning, overseen by a singular “defense ministry.” Recalling the UN peacekeeping operation during the last major European conflict prior to the Ukraine war—the South Slavic war—reveals a similar discord. Participating military units from Britain, France, and the Netherlands adhered to their respective governments’ directives, exhibiting reluctance to cooperate effectively despite the nominal existence of joint command. The impasse persisted until the intervention of the Clinton administration and the US Air Force, which compelled Belgrade to negotiate by bombarding Serb positions in Bosnia in September 1995.

Currently, decision-making remains decentralized among member state governments, complicating efforts at harmonization, as evidenced in the defense industry debacle. While the creation of the European Defence Fund in 2017 and the annual defense review represent initial steps, substantial progress hinges on member states’ willingness to relinquish more national sovereignty in favor of collective endeavors. Achieving joint defense industrial development and coordinated, large-scale, cost-effective stockpiling akin to NATO standards demands standardized protocols, confirms Tamás Varga Csiki..However, the development of the next-generation fighter aircraft, the Future Combat Air System, remains a distant prospect. The German-French-Spanish collaborative effort, involving Dassault, Indra, and Airbus, envisions potential deployment by the 2040s, amidst increasing orders for US F-35s.

Ukraine: Costs and Opportunities

As the November elections loom in the United States, there’s a palpable concern that regardless of the outcome, the nation may pivot away from Europe. The country increasingly directs its finite resources toward addressing its most pressing priority: China. This strategic shift may lead to a reluctance to engage in joint efforts against Russian aggression.

Conversely, within the EU, consensus on necessary actions remains elusive. While ten or twelve countries express willingness to share risks and commit to a common force, their alignment doesn’t necessarily align with staunch support for Ukraine. For instance, countries like Poland and Romania, staunch Atlanticists, exhibit a strong allegiance to the United States. The question of nuclear deterrence further complicates matters, particularly with France being the sole nuclear power within the EU post-Brexit. The willingness of member states to integrate this deterrent into a joint force, or to contribute financially to its maintenance, remains uncertain.

The potential return of Donald Trump to the White House amplifies these concerns. During his previous presidency, Trump openly discussed withdrawing the US from NATO—a sentiment he has reiterated recently. He even suggested that NATO members failing to meet the expected 2 percent GDP spending on their military might not receive US defense support. Ironically, many potential targets of Russian aggression, such as the Baltic States, Poland, and Finland, either meet or exceed this spending target.

In 2022, EU defense spending surged by 6% compared to the previous year, reaching a historic high of €240 billion. Although estimates project a further increase of 4.5% in 2023, this still falls short of NATO’s 2 percent GDP spending target. Seven countries, including Hungary, reported a decrease in defense spending in nominal terms.

Globally, military spending soared by 3.7% in real terms in 2022, reaching a record high of $2,240 billion, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The United States, China, and Russia collectively accounted for 56% of this expenditure. In Central and Western European countries, both EU and non-EU, defense spending surpassed the 1989 Cold War levels in real terms for the first time. Notable increases were observed in Finland (36%), Lithuania (27%), Sweden (12%), and Poland (11%). NATO’s total military spending reached $1,232 billion, a modest 0.9% increase from 2021.

These figures suggest that the democratic world possesses ample resources to support Ukraine’s courageous defense efforts, even if some NATO members fall short of the 2 percent spending threshold. Notably, the US, Germany, and the UK are the top contributors to Ukraine’s military capabilities. Moreover, the reconstruction of Ukraine could potentially herald the economic development of the century. Estimated recovery and reconstruction needs stand at $486 billion over ten years, nearly three times Ukraine’s nominal GDP in 2023. Investing in Ukraine today not only secures the West’s future but also promises to stimulate half of the world’s economy.

Optimistically, Tamas Varga envisions societal and political leaders recognizing the imperative of joint EU action within the next five to eight years. However, a bleaker prognosis suggests that stagnation will persist, exacerbating future crises and proving costly for all Europeans.

This article was funded by the European Union. The opinions and statements expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the European Union or the European Agency for Education and Culture (EACEA). Neither the European Union nor the EACEA can be held responsible for them.

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