Photo by Latvijas Mediji
József László, Bálint György Journalist Academy/Latvijas Avīze
The “Birds of the Hungarian” — that is what the 14th Ukrainian drone detachment, commanded by Hungarian-born Robert “Magyar” Brovdi, calls its fleet. This time, the unit’s kamikaze drones struck an oil pumping station in Unecha, in Russia’s Bryansk region. The attack was reported by Brovdi himself, who heads Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Command.
“As August 21 came to an end, the Unecha oil station was reduced to rubble. The 14th detachment’s birds stung the worms,” Brovdi wrote on social media, signing off with the slogan: “Russians go home!” He added that the drones’ journey toward Russian oil facilities would continue.
The Unecha terminal is the largest hub on the Druzhba (“Friendship”) oil pipeline, operated by Transnefteproduct, and supplies both civilian and military facilities inside Russia. It is a key artery in the 9,000-kilometer pipeline network.
Ukrainian drones had already hit the Unecha station on August 18 and 22, temporarily halting deliveries through Druzhba to Hungary and Slovakia. Budapest confirmed the disruption, underlining that Druzhba remains a lifeline for the region. According to Reuters, Kyiv’s objective was to weaken Russia’s energy revenues and export capacity. The line not only feeds Russian customers but also delivers crude to Belarusian refineries and fuels Moscow’s so-called “shadow fleet” of tankers.
Hungarian officials reacted angrily, branding the strike a threat to Hungary’s energy security and calling for intervention from the European Commission. Brussels, however, responded that Hungary held more than 90 days’ worth of reserves — meaning no immediate risk to supply. Still, the incident rekindled a long-standing question: why is Hungary still so dependent on Russian oil, and how long can that dependence last?
Soviet Legacy, Post-1990 Continuity
Like other Eastern Bloc countries, Hungary’s energy infrastructure was built to integrate with Soviet systems. The Druzhba pipeline carried crude; the Bratstvo (“Brotherhood”) line delivered natural gas. The potential for pipelines to become geopolitical weapons was clear even then. When Poland’s Solidarity movement rose to prominence 45 years ago, Moscow openly threatened to cut off supplies. This did not happen at the time, but it did indicate that the Friendship pipeline could be used in a very unfriendly way.
After the fall of communism, flows continued. Hungary’s national oil and gas company MOL grew into a regional heavyweight in Slovakia and Croatia, with major refineries in Százhalombatta (Danube Refinery) and Bratislava (Slovnaft). Together, the two plants process nearly 290,000 barrels of oil per day, forming the backbone of Hungarian-Slovak refining.
Even after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russian crude kept arriving at a discount, below global market prices, as Moscow sought to offload sanctioned oil.
Hungary’s government, committed to its flagship policy of artificially low household utility prices, had little interest in switching. Any rapid transition — whether refinery upgrades or new import routes — would have triggered price rises, politically difficult amid high inflation.
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has long portrayed Hungary as a “bridge” between East and West, using this narrative to justify special arrangements with Moscow. Energy dependence became a tool: it explained Hungary’s repeated vetoes of EU sanctions while securing cheap deals with Russia.
The setup also benefits MOL, which could refine discounted Urals crude and sell the products at higher European prices. Pro-government business networks, too, had every incentive to maintain the status quo.
Industry insiders estimate that Russian crude reached Hungary and Slovakia with discounts of $20–30 per barrel compared to Brent. The gap, split among MOL and a web of offshore intermediaries, amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Some of these deals were routed through companies in Dubai, Switzerland, or the Balkans, with commissions of $2–5 per barrel — or up to $800 million a year.
In practice, MOL processed the oil, pocketed the discount, and passed some profits to the state via taxes and dividends. But a significant share, analysts suggest, flowed into networks close to Orbán’s government. Between 2022 and 2025, such private and corporate windfalls may have totaled $1.2–2 billion — a powerful reason for Budapest to resist breaking with Russian supply.
Oil Routes: Druzhba vs. Adria
When the EU imposed its oil embargo in June 2022, crude delivered by pipeline was exempted for Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic.
As a result, Russian oil has kept flowing through Druzhba’s southern branch, despite frequent disruptions caused by Ukrainian transit disputes and infrastructure strikes.
The alternative is the Adria pipeline (JANAF), running from the Croatian Adriatic port of Omišalj (Krk) to Százhalombatta and Bratislava. It is a vital backup, but its use has been politically contentious. In February 2025, MOL and Croatian operator JANAF signed a one-year contract for 2.1 million tons (about 42,000 barrels per day), covering around 15% of Hungarian and Slovak demand.
Croatia insists the line could handle 14.4 million tons annually, more than enough to cover regional needs, while Budapest cites high transit fees and capacity limits. Disputes in 2024 spilled into the open, with the European Commission stepping in to mediate. By spring 2025, another partial rerouting deal was agreed.
The Unecha strikes underscored the stakes: Druzhba is vulnerable, and any disruption can hit regional refineries. For now, Hungary relies on a mix of Adria imports and stockpiles when Druzhba falters — but at higher financial and logistical costs.
Gas: Long-Term Contract, Balkan Route, “Hub Role”
In 2021, Hungary signed a 15-year gas contract with Gazprom, covering 4.5 bcm per year. Most of it — 3.5 bcm — enters via Serbia along the TurkStream/Balkan Stream route, with 1 bcm arriving via Austria. Since 2022, additional volumes have been shipped beyond the contracted amounts.
At the same time, Budapest booked capacity at Croatia’s Krk LNG terminal and signed deals with Shell, signaling modest diversification.
But Russian gas remains the cornerstone.
Hungary’s large storage facilities also serve Serbia, with joint companies and shared reserves turning Budapest into a regional gas player.
Nuclear: Fuel, Paks II, and Financial Ties
Nuclear energy is another area of deep Russian entanglement. The Paks Nuclear Power Plant, built between 1982–87 with Soviet VVER-440 reactors, still supplies nearly half of Hungary’s electricity. Its units have been granted lifetime extensions until 2032–37, with further extensions in preparation.
In 2014, Hungary and Russia signed a deal for two new reactors (Paks II), to be built by Rosatom and backed by a €10 billion Russian state loan. Construction has been delayed but moved forward in 2025 with major groundwork completed and regulatory approvals granted.
Meanwhile, fuel supply has started to diversify.
Since the war, TVEL fuel assemblies have been flown in or shipped via the Black Sea and the Balkans. In 2024, Hungary signed a long-term deal with France’s Framatome for alternative VVER-440 fuel — a symbolic reduction of reliance on Russia, though full independence will take time.
Looking ahead, Budapest has also launched preparatory work to introduce American small modular reactor (SMR) technology, led by U.S. firms such as GE Vernova. In Central Europe, licensing rights are held by Poland’s Synthos Green Energy.
What Lies Ahead?
For now, Hungary’s official position is clear: Druzhba remains the backbone, with Adria as a fallback. Contracts signed in 2025 reflect this hybrid model. Whether a new government would alter course — and how much longer Russian crude can flow without disruption — remain open questions.
In gas, the Gazprom deal locks Hungary into long-term dependency, though LNG from Krk and potential Azeri imports may gradually reduce exposure.
In nuclear, partial diversification is underway, but Paks II will tie Hungary to Russia for decades, both technologically and financially. SMRs could offer a future alternative, but only in the long term.
The Unecha strikes highlight a simple truth: Hungary’s energy security rests on fragile foundations. As Ukraine targets Russia’s oil infrastructure and Europe reshapes its energy landscape, Budapest’s insistence on being a “bridge” between East and West looks less like strategy — and more like a gamble.
