Szele Tamás: Disinformation and the Polish election

Zóna, 2025.06.09.
Although the Polish elections took place more than a week ago — with the well-known results — only now is there time to analyze the role Russian disinformation played in them. And as EU vs. Disinfo notes, the Kremlin didn’t give up this time either, but they seemed genuinely unsure which candidate to favor — so they simply hated all of them equally.

The Polish presidential election showed exactly how the Kremlin’s chaos machine operates. From the fog of wild accusations and false claims, one key theme emerged: the erosion of public support for Ukraine.

On 1 June, Poland held the second and final round of its 2025 presidential election. The two candidates were historian Karol Nawrocki, representing the conservative Law and Justice party, and Rafał Trzaskowski, the mayor of Warsaw and member of the liberal Civic Platform.

Poland has long been a favorite target for pro-Kremlin disinformation, and the weeks of the campaign were no exception. Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Kremlin-directed anti-Polish disinformation has remained relentlessly intense. In 2025, Kremlin-aligned channels continued to portray Poland as the “chief warmongering villain” of Europe, or as the “Russia-hating hyena of Europe.” In such an overheated environment, the presidential election did not produce a noticeable spike in disinformation — the baseline was already extremely high, as shown below.

The key tactics, techniques and procedures used by pro-Kremlin manipulators and disinformation channels have not changed, and they are worth summarizing. They aim to smear leaders; sow distrust, doubt and division; flood social media with falsehoods to turn public opinion against Ukraine; project Russia’s own failures onto the EU to distract from the reality of Putin’s Russia; and finally, reject results and drive wedges between people. Unsurprisingly, these tactics also resonated throughout the recent Polish presidential election.


The Kremlin’s Old Tradition: Contempt and Hostility Toward Poland

Before the election, Kremlin-aligned channels painted the situation in Poland in apocalyptic tones. Allegedly, Poland was in deep crisis. Despite President Duda’s promises, millions struggled with poverty, inflation and frustration. Nearly half the population could barely make ends meet, while the election campaign was riddled with corruption scandals, foreign interference and protests. Panicked Poles were said to be withdrawing cash from ATMs, fearing economic collapse and financial restrictions. Spreading such false narratives is a classic example of the “projection” tactic — only this time, the target wasn’t the EU but Poland.

As the campaign gained momentum, pro-Kremlin channels began deploying all their familiar anti-Polish narratives. Poland was depicted as aggressive, warmongering and Russophobic. Allegedly, it harbored imperialist, anti-Russian and even anti-Ukrainian intentions. One agency claimed that Poland was preparing its forces for a pre-emptive strike against Russia. But Poland’s supposed villainy didn’t end there — others claimed that the country coveted the Kaliningrad region, or even planned to conquer Russia.

Kremlin specialists were just getting started. One commentator called Poland “the hyena of Europe” and said the country suffered from “pathological Russophobia.” Another pro-Kremlin expert claimed that Warsaw was using the election as a pretext to cut diplomatic ties with Moscow. A third accused incompetent Polish politicians of using the race as an excuse to deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on Polish soil. Yet another repeated claims that Poland harbors imperial ambitions toward its “Ukrainian partners” and “smells the stench of Ukraine’s rotting flesh.”


Three Major Disinformation Narratives Took Shape

During the campaign, three overarching narratives emerged.
The first framed the election as a shadow battle between Trump and “Soros-style globalists.”
The second predicted that Ukraine would be the main loser of the Polish election.
The third claimed that both presidential candidates were hard-line Russophobes.

Below, each of these narratives is explored in more detail.


Narrative 1: “The Polish Election Is a Shadow Fight Between Trump, Brussels, and Soros-Style Globalists”

This pro-Kremlin narrative claimed that the presidential race was not a fair, democratic contest, but a shadow battle between foreign power centers such as Donald Trump, Brussels, and “Soros-style globalists.” Brussels, Berlin and the American Democrats were allegedly backing Trzaskowski, while Trump and the supporters of the “Intermarium Project” backed Nawrocki. Poland was portrayed as torn between globalists and Eurosceptics, though both sides — so the claim goes — shared an anti-Russian agenda.

Some outlets even claimed that former U.S. President Barack Obama, billionaire George Soros, and the “globalist left” were trying to rig the election, while the EU supposedly used the vote to advance its own interests. A video claimed that foreign intelligence services were using the election to provoke a battle of fraudsters and perverts funded with dirty money. Meanwhile, Polish voters were said to have turned into Stockholm-syndrome sheep.

On the EU, a pro-Kremlin outlet claimed that Europe’s elite would not accept a defeat of liberal forces in Poland because Europe was sliding toward a totalitarian liberal dictatorship. If Nawrocki were to win, the European Commission and Prime Minister Tusk would supposedly “start a war” and challenge the legitimacy of his victory.


Narrative 2: “Ukraine Is the Main Loser of the Polish Election”

Pro-Kremlin outlets claimed that Ukraine would be the biggest loser of the Polish election, regardless of the outcome. Whoever won would allegedly turn against Ukraine.

There was no shortage of “examples.” One article argued that anti-Ukrainian sentiment would decide the vote. Another, using classic Kremlin tactics designed to turn EU citizens against Ukraine, claimed that Poles were tired of supporting the country. According to one commentator, the far-right gained ground because the influx of Ukrainian refugees and free aid to Ukraine boosted radical support. Another article depicted the two main candidates as suddenly competing over who could be more anti-Ukrainian, supposedly furious with President Zelensky and Ukrainian refugees.

Finally, one article claimed that Kyiv was in a state of hysteria because anti-Ukrainian sentiment had spread among Poland’s right-wing forces.


Narrative 3: “It Doesn’t Matter Who Wins — Trzaskowski and Nawrocki Are Both Hard-Line Russophobes”

A third narrative — using the “reject the results” tactic — insisted that both candidates were hard-line Russophobes. So it didn’t matter who took power; relations with Russia would not improve, as Warsaw would continue taking aggressive, anti-Russian steps.

One article described both candidates as equally hateful toward Russia, just in different ways. A commentator claimed that “Trzaskowski has personal grievances against Russia,” while Nawrocki has “historical problems.” Another argued that it made no difference to Russia who won, because Warsaw supposedly wanted Ukraine to keep fighting no matter what. Another article claimed both candidates were Russia-haters, so the outcome would not change bilateral relations. Meanwhile, one commentator leapt into a classically manipulative, misogynistic metaphor, comparing the election to “looking for a virgin symbolizing female virtue in a cheap dockside brothel.” Social-media algorithms predictably amplify anger, strong emotions and outrage because they drive engagement.

Some related disinformation also surfaced. One narrative claimed that any new Polish president would prioritize breaking off peace talks regarding Ukraine and securing an EU military victory over Russia. Both Trzaskowski and Nawrocki would allegedly support any anti-Russian move. Meanwhile, another article and video portrayed Nawrocki as hostile to Russia because he participated in dismantling Soviet soldiers’ monuments.


“Trump Is Now President of Poland”

Pro-Kremlin outlets and commentators greeted Karol Nawrocki’s victory on 2 June by declaring that Trump had effectively become the President of Poland. One article concluded that Nawrocki’s victory marked the beginning of what Moscow sees as Europe’s “Trumpization.” According to the article, his win was a slap in the face for Brussels and a gift for President Trump.

Mocking the EU and predicting its “imminent collapse” is another Kremlin favorite, so it was no surprise to see the article end with: “Europe’s ‘Trumpization’ has begun — who will be next?”


The New Polish President Is on Russia’s Wanted List

After Nawrocki’s victory, Kremlin-aligned outlets noted that he is wanted in Russia for alleged crimes. In February 2024, Nawrocki was placed on Russia’s wanted list for taking part in dismantling Red Army monuments in Poland.

Accordingly, one article described Nawrocki as “the ideologue of dismantling Soviet monuments.” The author argued that his victory would not change much in Polish-Russian relations.

Applying the “reject the results” tactic once more, the article claimed that both sides of Polish politics base their strategy on Russophobia. Therefore, Nawrocki’s foreign policy would follow a hard anti-Russian line, regardless of what Russia does. The Kremlin rarely misses an opportunity to portray itself as the victim.


The Real Mystery: Why Interfere at All?

One thing in this whole story is hard to understand. Moscow seemed prepared to hate whoever won the Polish election. That’s a safe position, considering that a pro-Russian Polish president is about as imaginable right now as Vladimir Putin marrying Patriarch Kirill.

Fine, that part is clear. But then — why interfere at all?

One gets the sense that sometimes the Kremlin’s disinformation operatives simply act out of habit. Pure routine, nothing more.


Source: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/polish-elections-in-the-eyes-of-moscow/

This article was produced with the financial support of the European Union. The views and statements expressed herein reflect the position of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official stance of the European Union or the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA). Neither the European Union nor EACEA can be held responsible for them. Zóna did not receive funding; it merely provides a platform for the article.

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