Tamás Szele / Magyar Hang
The concept of the “Zangezur Corridor” hasn’t yet reached widespread recognition in Europe, though this is likely to change soon. This proposed route is of crucial importance to the Russian Federation, Iran, and China, while locally it holds particular significance for Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Let’s first define the Zangezur Corridor. It is a proposed unobstructed transit route that would connect Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave, then pass through Armenia’s Syunik Province to reach Turkey. Essentially, the corridor would consist of a railway line alongside a highway. Tehran, however, strongly opposes its construction.
Unlike historical trade routes dating back centuries, the Zangezur route took shape during World War II. British and American Lend-Lease supplies—especially Studebaker trucks—were initially shipped to Iranian ports, from where they traveled either to Caspian Sea ports like Makhachkala or Astrakhan, or to the Julfa railway station in Nakhchivan. From there, goods could be easily transported to Yerevan and beyond to Georgia, Sochi, Rostov-on-Don, or Baku, and further into Dagestan and Stalingrad. After the war, the Moscow-Baku-Tehran train also used this route, crossing the Soviet-Iranian border at Julfa. Trains from Yerevan to southern Armenia, including Meghri and Kapan, likewise passed through Nakhchivan.
Infrastructure existed in the region, although it didn’t follow the exact path now proposed. However, following the Georgian-Abkhaz and Karabakh conflicts during the Soviet Union’s collapse, this route became unusable. The conflicts made it impossible to reach Armenia or Georgia by rail, and without an open Armenian-Azerbaijani border, travel to Iran and Turkey was also blocked.
To address this deadlock, the Zangezur Corridor was conceived, though the idea isn’t new—it has been under consideration for years. Yet, the project faces numerous challenges.
Local and Global Issues
The problem has both local and global aspects. Locally, a major concern is that Azerbaijan, if granted access to this route, would have the right to transport goods across Armenian territory without Armenian border controls. This could become a constant source of conflict; even a minor traffic accident could lead to accusations of provocation or aggression, with Armenia or Azerbaijan possibly seeking political or even military retribution over an accidental flat tire. This issue already affects the current route, but neither side is willing to forgo it, making it a key element in the November 9, 2020, trilateral agreement that allowed Armenia to retain part of Nagorno-Karabakh after its defeat. According to the agreement, the “Zangezur Corridor” was to be monitored by Russian border guards stationed on the Armenian-Iranian border since 1992.
In 2021, the plan seemed fully feasible, with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev even threatening to construct the corridor “with or without Armenia’s consent.” In 2022, the “restoration of transportation links” was cited as a fundamental point in normalizing relations between Baku and Yerevan. But then Russia invaded Ukraine, and the situation changed dramatically.
The Kremlin now prioritizes unimpeded goods transport to and from Iran, which is currently handled either via the Caspian Sea or through Azerbaijan. The Caspian route, however, is mainly used for arms shipments. In September 2022, U.S. intelligence detected irregularities in tracking data on Caspian vessels shortly after the U.S. and Ukrainian governments claimed that Moscow was acquiring drones from Tehran. It is suspected that arms shipments from Tehran to Moscow use this route, with ships concealing parts of their journey by disabling transponders, thereby obscuring destinations and transfers. Moscow envisions the port of Makhachkala in Dagestan as a key hub for this route, which connects via maritime paths to Iranian ports like Astara, Anzali, Noshahr, and Amirabad. Expanding these connections is a strategic priority for Russia, which established the JSC North-South company to manage the Makhachkala Sea Commercial Port.
In recent years, Iran has also increased its shipping capacity in the Caspian, with Iranian companies more involved in Russian projects there, as well as along the Volga. Iran’s commercial fleet expanded by 15 ships in 2022, and Khazar-Shipping plans to increase its fleet to 27 vessels. Additionally, in 2015, Iran’s Nasim Bahr Kish company acquired a majority share in the “Solyanka” port in Russia’s Astrakhan region. However, Iran’s economy faces severe issues, including U.S. sanctions and significant infrastructure deficits. Only around 20% of its northern ports and 60% of its southern ports have modern infrastructure, and its railways remain largely unelectrified. In 2019, railways handled only 2-3% of freight, while outdated, inefficient diesel trucks accounted for over half of Iran’s transportation capacity. Despite these obstacles, Iran is actively pursuing increased trade relations with Russia, China, India, and other regional countries, even seeking foreign investment.
Geopolitical Implications
We’re now entering a global perspective. Iran has boosted exports of industrial products (such as polystyrene, pumps, auto parts, and metalworking machinery) to Russia by 30%, complementing its traditional agricultural exports. Although trade between Russia and Iran remains modest, both nations aim to increase their economic exchanges. Russia became Iran’s largest foreign investor in the past financial year, with an estimated $2.76 billion invested in Iran’s industrial, mining, and transportation sectors.
Given these shared interests, it would seem logical for the Zangezur Corridor to be constructed swiftly—but why does Tehran object?
Tehran’s primary concern is that the corridor could allow regional rivals, Russia or Turkey, to control its routes to Georgia, the Black Sea, and Europe through Armenia. If this were to happen, it might reduce China’s interest in an overland connection to Europe via Iran and Turkey. The corridor was a central topic in recent talks between Putin and Aliyev in Baku. Later, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remark that Armenia was “sabotaging” the opening of South Caucasus transport links drew protests from Tehran. This revived Tehran’s longstanding grievances, which surfaced in political statements directed at Moscow. Iran even conducted unannounced military drills near the Zangezur Corridor. Tehran’s priorities for South Caucasus corridors focus on three points: the Zangezur Corridor should be under Armenian control; Iran’s interests must be considered in any corridor plans; and neither the West, Israel, Turkey, nor NATO should be allowed to “use corridor construction as a pretext to enter Iran’s northern borders.” Iran fears the corridor could strengthen NATO’s and Europe’s influence near its borders, especially as Armenia’s ties with the West grow and Turkey expands its influence across the South Caucasus and into Central Asia (a primary aim of the Turkic Council). Tehran clearly understands that the corridor’s opening could diminish its influence in the South Caucasus.
In the West, it was popular over the past three years to view Russia as the main lobbyist for “unlocking transportation routes in the South Caucasus.” But now, it’s apparent that viable transportation links won’t be established for years, and the Kremlin doesn’t seem overly concerned. They likely believe that an alternative to the Zangezur Corridor could emerge through Iran, following a similar path but on the opposite side of the narrow Aras River border.
A Complex Geopolitical Puzzle
There’s a paradox here: the Zangezur Corridor isn’t just about facilitating Russian trade with countries in the Global South; it also aims to prevent Western nations from using Russian routes to trade with China. The only question is the direction of the train from Julfa—whether it goes to Iran or Turkey. Although there’s no direct rail line to Turkey yet, solutions are underway to address this.
However, if the corridor goes through Iran, issues remain: Iran is sanctioned, just like Russia. China, keen on smooth trade routes to Europe, would find this problematic since outbound goods might reach Europe, but return shipments would face restrictions. To avoid this, the route would ideally pass solely through Azerbaijan and Armenia, keeping it as far from the Iranian border as possible.
Meanwhile, Kazakhstan advocates for the current Trans-Caspian route. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev recently wrote in a political article that “Kazakhstan, together with its partners, is actively developing the Trans-Caspian international route, with transport volumes expected to increase fivefold in the medium term.” He didn’t specify which partners were involved, leaving it unclear who may be quietly distancing themselves from the Zangezur Corridor.
One more factor to consider: Russia, whose international reputation has suffered due to its invasion of Ukraine, now views the Zangezur Corridor as a way to regain influence in Armenia and reassert itself as a vital transit hub opposing the West. Conversely, Yerevan, having distanced itself from the CSTO (the security alliance of post-Soviet states) and strengthened ties with the EU and the U.S., views the corridor as a threat to its sovereignty and opposes Russian control over it.
In summary, Russian, Iranian, Chinese, Azerbaijani, Armenian, Turkish, and even Euro-Atlantic interests are at play here, most of which are mutually incompatible. Without a consensus among these stakeholders, the Zangezur Corridor may never materialize. This situation, chaotic as it is, embodies what the Kremlin calls “multipolar world politics.”
