Author: Robert Brestan, HlidaciPes.org
Almost exactly one year after setting out to torch a bus depot in Prague’s Klíčov district on the night of June 5-6, a 27-year-old Colombian has now been sentenced by a Czech court. He confessed to a terrorist attack and was handed an eight-year prison term, which he is to serve in Colombia. As Russian sabotage operations and other hybrid forms of warfare against the West intensify, such cases are likely to become more frequent.
The young man, Andres Alfonso De La Hoz De La Cruz, did not spend much time at large in the Czech Republic. He was in Prague for just five days before his arrest by police. He then spent the following year in custody.
He has now agreed to a plea deal, admitting to the terrorist attack and consenting to deportation to his home country, where he is to serve an eight-year sentence.
According to the Czech Security Information Service (BIS), De La Cruz was recruited for the act by Russian intelligence services. He confirmed that his motivation was financial reward. As in other similar cases, the social media platform Telegram played a significant role.
The international network of investigative journalists OCCRP recently revealed that the technical infrastructure of Telegram—including control over thousands of IP addresses and the management of servers running the system—is overseen by Russian businessman Viktor Vedeneev, whose companies collaborate with Russian intelligence services.
An Extraordinary Level of Threat
“Hiring foreigners, often individuals with colorful criminal pasts, for illicit activities is a new Russian tactic, and it can be described as highly strategic. Among other things, it allows Russia to easily distance itself publicly from the actions carried out by these individuals,” BIS Director Michal Koudelka commented earlier for HlídacíPes.org.
According to BIS, the primary threat in Europe comes from three Russian intelligence agencies: SVR, GRU, and FSB.
“GRU, in particular, has not undergone significant changes since the Soviet era. All of them are capable of conducting subversive operations abroad and eliminating Russia’s adversaries. These agencies are among the best in the world and should not be underestimated. Their methods have not changed, though they are influenced by technological advancements. They operate without legal constraints or public oversight,” Koudelka explained last year during a session in the Czech Chamber of Deputies.
Russian sabotage activities in Europe are far from isolated, with warnings openly issued by countries including Norway, Poland, Germany, the UK, and others. Last year, the heads of German intelligence services spoke unusually candidly during a Bundestag hearing about thwarted attacks bearing Russian fingerprints.
Jonathan Hall, the UK government’s chief adviser on state threats and terrorism, recently told The New York Times that “hostile states are paying local criminals to carry out acts of violence, espionage, and intimidation.”
While the young Colombian was being tried in Prague, a group of six men faced trial in London for an arson attack on a company supplying satellite equipment to Ukraine.
Last month, a group of Bulgarians was also sentenced in the UK to prison terms for being part of a Russian espionage network based on England’s east coast.
Hall emphasizes that these are not isolated incidents but part of a new reality. Russian attempts at hostile actions on British soil, he says, create an “extraordinary level of threat, which may be harder for the public to grasp than the threat of terrorism.”
“While terrorism grabs public attention due to the death, destruction, and chaos it causes, state-sponsored threats are far less tangible for the public,” Hall explains.
Cyberspace, Propaganda, Sabotage
In the Czech Republic, efforts to combat Russian disinformation are often met with skepticism, and the term “hybrid threats” remains abstract for much of the public.
“Modern hybrid threats span a wide range of areas—from information-psychological operations, disinformation, and propaganda to activities in cyberspace, critical infrastructure sectors, targeted sabotage, and efforts to influence democratic processes and elections,” write Pavel Havlíček and Lukáš Horák in an analysis by the Association for International Affairs.
Beyond election interference, these threats include cyberattacks on state institutions, healthcare facilities, European transport and energy infrastructure, including pipelines, telecommunications networks, and undersea cables. The rise in threats is closely tied to Russian aggression, both against Ukraine and “Western society as a whole,” as Russia “systematically seeks to destabilize European societies.”
The Czech Republic’s 2023 Security Strategy explicitly names the Russian Federation as the primary actor behind hybrid threats targeting the country.
“To achieve these goals, Russia actively employs foreign information manipulation and interference,” the Czech Ministry of Defense stated at a recent National Convention on the EU roundtable on hybrid threats. It highlighted the risks of cyberattacks and sabotage, citing examples such as:
“Arson attacks targeting logistics, shopping centers, and public transport; remotely disabled sensors, controllers, and switches in critical infrastructure.”
