Modern propaganda no longer arrives primarily in the form of outright falsehoods, but through carefully crafted, emotionally charged narratives. Kremlin-friendly messages work exactly this way: simple slogans, fear-mongering, repetition—and a worldview that feels familiar and digestible to many.
The goal is not necessarily to make us believe that Russia is spotless. Rather, it is to make us doubt whom we should trust. “The West is hypocritical,” “Ukraine started the war,” “Brussels wants to subjugate us”—these claims sound familiar not only from Russian state media but also from certain domestic channels.
The spread of disinformation does not occur in a vacuum. It takes root where skepticism toward the West is strong, where historical grievances persist, and where elements of government communication overlap with Kremlin talking points. This makes the Western Balkans, Moldova and Hungary particularly vulnerable.
According to a 2024 analysis by Political Capital, Hungarian society is among the most susceptible within the European Union to pro-Russian narratives. The Hungarian government’s rhetoric—whether about “war-mongering Brussels” or the “defense of national sovereignty”—often echoes Moscow’s messaging.
Public media news broadcasts rarely highlight the positive aspects of supporting Ukraine, and critical voices presenting the realities of the war are scarcely represented. A 2023 Eurobarometer survey found that 41 percent of Hungarians oppose EU support for Ukraine—compared to the EU average of 22 percent. The picture is further complicated by the fact that one-third of Hungarian respondents believe Ukraine itself is responsible for the outbreak of the war—one of the highest rates in the EU.
The success of Kremlin-friendly narratives lies in their simple, emotion-driven explanations of the world, which resonate with social frustrations. In Hungary, this mechanism is particularly effective because segments of the state-controlled information space align with these messages, while there are few independent platforms with broad reach offering counter-narratives. Thus, these narratives become not only tools in geopolitical power plays, but also key instruments in shaping public opinion.
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Source: Political Capital – Acceptance of Pro-Kremlin Narratives in Hungary
In the crosshairs of reality – Pro-Kremlin narratives
Kondor Róza, Veszprém Kukac
