The Caucasian Chalk Circle: Is Russia Losing the South Caucasus?

The conflict between Moscow and Baku has not been resolved. Russia lacks strong leverage. Will Russia — already in a rather difficult geopolitical position — be forced to concede the South Caucasus, especially now that Armenia, its long-standing ally, has gradually been turning away over the past decade?

What developments are emerging in this highly complex region — the South Caucasus?

“Since the Karabakh conflict, efforts to push Russia out of the South Caucasus have intensified. The main initiator of this process is Turkey. Moscow even names a specific figure behind it — Richard Moore, the head of British intelligence, who previously served as ambassador to Turkey and played a role in helping Erdoğan consolidate leadership.

Russia is trying to regain its influence. It did not support Armenia when it needed help, and now it wants to place the blame on a single individual. The internal developments in Armenia, including Pashinyan’s confrontations with the Church, are a reflection of this. In short, this is a struggle for influence — between Russia, the West, primarily Turkey, and China is now appearing on the horizon as well,”
— security analyst Mamuka Areshidze told Fortuna.

Russia Is Losing the South Caucasus

A brief look at recent developments in the region:

Over the years, Moscow shifted from being Armenia’s loyal ally to becoming closer to Azerbaijan. At minimum, Russia did nothing to prevent Azerbaijan — backed militarily by Turkey and technically by Israel — from regaining control over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Later, Moscow, Ankara, and Baku pressured Armenia to open the so-called Zangezur Corridor — a land route in southern Armenia that would connect Turkey and Azerbaijan, placing the route under joint control and cutting Armenia off from Iran — its last potential regional military ally.

However, recent developments changed the landscape. Iran came under Israeli attack and was, at least temporarily, pushed out of active geopolitical maneuvering. Almost simultaneously, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan paid a historic state visit to Turkey — the first of its kind. During this time, Armenia has increasingly distanced itself from Russia, seeking security guarantees in the West.

We should also recall President Zelensky’s phone call to President Aliyev — an open challenge to Putin. Zelensky also spoke with French President Emmanuel Macron, whose government is in conflict with Azerbaijan due to strong support for Armenia. Meanwhile, internal political confrontation against pro-Russian forces has intensified inside Armenia.

All of this suggests a profound shift: the central role in the region now belongs not to Russia, but to Turkey — together with its ally Azerbaijan. Is the Kremlin gradually losing the South Caucasus?

How Far Will Baku Go in Confronting Moscow?

The cancellation of the Russian Deputy Prime Minister’s visit, formal accusations against Russian security officials of torture and murder, the beating of detained Russian citizens in Baku, a raid on the office of a Russian state news agency, and comparisons in Azerbaijani state media likening Russia to Nazi Germany — this is only a partial list of steps Azerbaijan has taken following the death of the Safarov brothers in Yekaterinburg.

The Kremlin referred to this as a diplomatic demarche, while the tone of Russian propagandists reflects confusion and irritation toward the actions of what is nominally a strategic ally.

Such incidents have never before had this level of impact on relations between the two countries. In 2021, an Azerbaijani citizen died during detention in Novosibirsk, and in 2020 and 2023 Russian soldiers were killed during Azerbaijani military operations. Yet none of these episodes led to such a deterioration.

What happened in Yekaterinburg may not be the cause, but rather a symptom of unresolved tensions that emerged after the crash of an Azerbaijan Airlines aircraft last December. According to reports, Russian air defense systems mistakenly shot down the Azerbaijani passenger plane, killing 38 people. President Putin offered an apology, but it was not enough. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev demanded that Russia accept responsibility and conduct a thorough investigation.

A Convenient Pretext Rather Than the Cause

Professor Emil Avdaliani, an expert on the Middle East and a lecturer at the European University, discussed Azerbaijan–Russia relations in an interview with Interpressnews.

“Tensions between Baku and Moscow began in December 2024, when an Azerbaijani aircraft was fired upon over Russian territory. The developments in Yekaterinburg further intensified the strained relations between the two countries.

In my view, these events serve more as a pretext than the actual cause of the tension. After Baku fully regained control over Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, which was followed by the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers, significant changes in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy were inevitable.

Azerbaijan’s political dependence on Moscow has decreased. At the same time, Baku has actively been deepening relations with other key players. In recent months, we have seen increased engagement with Pakistan, the United States, the European Union, Central Asian states, Israel, and others.

To this should be added improved relations with Iran and traditionally strong ties with Turkey. Naturally, Russia — which seeks to maintain a leading role in the South Caucasus — is displeased with Azerbaijan pursuing a foreign policy increasingly independent of Moscow.

Moreover, Azerbaijan remains an important trade and transit partner for Russia. The western section of the North–South transport corridor, which connects Russia to Iran, the Persian Gulf, and India, runs through Azerbaijan.

Baku understands this strategic advantage well, which partly explains Azerbaijan’s unexpectedly firm reaction to the Yekaterinburg incident.”

What Leverage Does Moscow Have Left?

There is no real opposition in Azerbaijan; the country is governed by an authoritarian regime, which means there is no domestic force that Russia could encourage against the government.

The trade balance between Russia and Azerbaijan is tilted in Moscow’s favor, but it cannot be said that Azerbaijan is directly dependent on Russia. The relationship is more one of mutual dependency. Notably, in 2024, Putin discussed with Aliyev the possibility of selling Russian oil and gas under Azerbaijani export labels as a way to circumvent sanctions.

Furthermore, Russia cannot threaten Azerbaijan with military force. Its army is tied down in Ukraine. And Aliyev knows that Turkey stands firmly behind him.

Armenia’s Attempt at Strategic Realignment

Armenia appears to be seeking reconciliation with Azerbaijan and Turkey in order to reduce dependence on Russia.

In 2024, Armenia froze its participation in the CSTO, the Russian-led military bloc.
In early 2025, the Armenian parliament initiated steps toward EU accession — an openly hostile move in Moscow’s view.

Avdaliani notes:

“The government in Yerevan is trying to build a more flexible foreign policy, less dependent on a single power. A normalization with Turkey would open trade routes, access to Turkish ports, and broader entry into EU markets.

However, Ankara insists that progress requires signing a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The text is ready, but Baku demands that Armenia amend its constitution to remove references to unification with Nagorno-Karabakh.”

Can the Caucasus Stand United?

Fortuna spoke with security analyst Mamuka Areshidze.

Is there any chance that Azerbaijan and Armenia might stand together — even based on shared interests or a common adversary?

“No, that is impossible. First of all, they cannot share the same allies. Yerevan does not want to fall under Turkish influence. Armenia seeks the West — primarily France. Georgia is oriented toward maintaining balance. The opposition accuses the government of being pro-Russian, but the situation is more nuanced. Whether the current policies are good or bad is another discussion entirely.”

And the West? Will Europe encourage Armenia in any meaningful way?

“The West will find it very difficult to do so unless Armenia becomes part of some form of military alliance. There are attempts to build something outside of NATO, but here is the problem: Western political elites are not ready to assume greater responsibility. They cannot make decisive moves. In 2008, the West also could not determine how to act toward Georgia — or more precisely, could not reach a coherent position.

There are significant geopolitical challenges in the region, and all major actors want to control the space.”

What will Russia do — especially after the war in Ukraine?

“It depends on how the war ends. If Russia does not emerge victorious — and we are not even speaking of total defeat — it will struggle to take assertive steps.”

“I view the near future of the region pessimistically. A serious contest is underway among major global players, and this struggle may cost not only governments their stability, but could even threaten the territorial integrity of some states. The issue of the Zangezur Corridor is more geopolitical than geo-economic.”

“No one cares about our perspective — including Azerbaijan, one of the region’s dominant actors. Ideally, the parties would find a joint formula for a shared corridor concept — but that is unrealistic. Joint control would be advantageous; Armenia also needs its own dividends. However, Azerbaijan’s expansive ambitions make such cooperation extremely difficult.”