(Investigative report by László Gárdai, edited by József László) infovilag.hu 2025.06.01.
The world’s largest bank robbery — not carried out with guns or crowbars, but with a two-thirds parliamentary majority. This meme has spread like wildfire across social media, neatly capturing public opinion on the Hungarian National Bank’s (MNB) foundations and how taxpayers’ money could somehow “lose its public nature.”
Opaque corporate networks, overpriced investments, and losses of up to 150 billion forints — these are among the findings in the State Audit Office’s (ÁSZ) report on the central bank’s foundations. According to László Windisch, president of the State Audit Office (ÁSZ), the MNB’s investment decisions were unprofessional and its reports unsuitable for effective oversight. The foundation, he said, failed to follow the required prudent investment policy.
Former MNB president György Matolcsy considers these reports completely unfounded. In the first episode of his podcast series, he said:
“Eighty percent of the State Audit Office’s findings are false, and twenty percent are untrue. The foundation was never in trouble — I’d be curious to know on what basis the president of the ÁSZ claims otherwise. The foundation managed its assets excellently; its value is far above the 266.4 billion-forint founding capital — over 500 billion. It was a uniquely long and oddly-styled investigation by one state institution into another; the whole process is almost incomprehensible. I hope it ends soon and the truth comes out.”
The State Audit Office responded with a single word: “Indeed.”
Windisch László stated that Matolcsy’s criminal liability had not been established but could not be ruled out either. He argued that since Matolcsy held no position in the foundations’ boards or supervisory bodies, nor in the investment companies or fund managers, any criminal acts would most likely have been committed by members of those bodies.
The scandal around the MNB erupted when the ÁSZ, following its audits of the Pallas Athéné Domus Meriti Foundation (PADME) and the Neumann János University Foundation, filed a complaint against unknown perpetrators on suspicion of asset-related and financial misconduct: of PADME’s 500 billion-forint assets, at least 150–200 billion may have been lost through poor or deliberately bad investment decisions.
According to the ÁSZ report, the MNB foundations’ asset manager, OPTIMA Zrt., hid public funds behind a complex network of companies and private equity funds. While hundreds of billions were lost on unprofitable stock market deals, companies linked to the former central bank governor’s family — including his son Ádám Matolcsy and his circle — conducted transactions that resulted in the creation of private wealth worth billions of forints.
“From a legal perspective, it’s not easy to determine what exactly happened around the MNB foundations. In the background, a complex and opaque political game is also being played,”
— explained legal sociologist Mátyás Bencze to Hírklikk.
“Regarding the foundations’ real-estate purchases, there’s debate even among professionals. Lawyers, economists, and public figures interpret the events differently.”
Transparency International Hungary had already bombarded the MNB with data requests back in April 2014 over suspicious, high-value art purchases, recalled Miklós Ligeti, the organization’s legal director.
“The MNB’s profit, as is well known, came from the conversion of foreign-currency loans into forints,” he explained.
“We issued a statement on October 2, 2014, warning that the 267 billion forint capitalization of the foundations amounted to a serious misappropriation of public funds. When the truth about where the money had gone was about to come out, they tried to classify it. That’s when Lajos Kósa made his infamous comment that the foundation’s money had ‘lost its public nature.’
Until 2020 the money — around 283 billion forints — still existed, mostly in government bonds. Then they bought shares in Globe Trade Center, a company listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, for about 200 billion, and also invested in a Swiss real-estate developer. Later, they borrowed 127.5 billion forints in bond form from the Neumann János University Foundation in Kecskemét.
We’re less interested in what these shares are worth now; what matters for determining legal liability is how much was paid for them at the time of purchase. The question is: how much was skimmed off during those transactions? The damage will only be recovered if at least part of the embezzled money can still be reclaimed.”
Is criminal prosecution realistic?
“The real question is whether there’s any political will to pursue it. It’s possible that a ‘no-go’ order has been issued, since it’s suspicious that after four or five months of investigation, the central bank’s leadership and those aware of these transactions haven’t even been questioned. From several sources, I know that the State Audit Office filed a complaint as early as January 22. We still haven’t received a response to our data request on this. A clear-cut crime was committed over nine years, yet proceedings have only just begun.”
Economist Péter Róna — formerly a member of the MNB’s Supervisory Board — noted that Windisch László, now head of the ÁSZ and formerly MNB vice-president, was directly involved in establishing these foundations. Róna recalled that at the board’s February 2014 meeting, he warned that the structure was conducive to clientelism and private enrichment.
According to him, the case won’t be resolved quickly:
“They’ll conclude that the foundations’ staff made poor decisions, and that the board members are responsible. It’s legally complex and will require a long investigation — years will pass, lawsuits will follow, and Matolcsy will likely walk free. Whether any asset loss occurred will ultimately be for the courts to decide.”
Former MNB president and economist Péter Ákos Bod added that while the central bank can legally create foundations consistent with the Central Bank Act, profit-oriented investment activity is forbidden. The owner — the Ministry of Finance — would have been justified in asking why profits belonging to the state budget were being diverted into investments.
He said the ÁSZ report also attempts to trace how money flowed from the central bank to the foundations, and through them to the operating companies.
“These companies then distributed funds through contracts — or worse, through investments — to private enterprises. To make matters worse, these businesses are personally linked to the MNB’s top leadership, so the threads tangle, extending abroad and into indirect ownership structures. The State Audit Office itself had to conclude that the transfers were intentionally made overly complex.”
Can it be proven that private wealth was created from central bank money?
“I don’t know. The State Audit Office has done its job, and the case is now under investigation. What’s clear, however, is that the governor’s family and close associates have become enormously wealthy.”
It seems the economic and political threads intertwine…
“The scale is striking: if hundreds of billions never reach the state budget and are siphoned off under the guise of central-bank independence, that can only happen if the owner tolerates it — or even encourages it. The bank’s profits couldn’t have been diverted without top-level political approval. The central bank’s financial position directly affects the state budget, which means the Ministry of Finance — and indeed the entire government and the prime minister — all bear responsibility.
It’s inconceivable that the creation and operation of a hundred-billion-forint foundation would go unnoticed by the owner. Either the oversight bodies failed, or they knowingly allowed this strange practice. We can now see that the MNB’s former leadership built an enormous and complex corporate network — what remains to be seen is the legal judgment, which will hopefully come in time.”
This article was produced with the financial support of the European Union. The views and opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA). Neither the European Union nor the EACEA can be held responsible for them.
The world’s largest bank robbery — not carried out with guns or crowbars, but with a two-thirds parliamentary majority. This meme has spread like wildfire across social media, neatly capturing public opinion on the Hungarian National Bank’s (MNB) foundations and how taxpayers’ money could somehow “lose its public nature.”
Opaque corporate networks, overpriced investments, and losses of up to 150 billion forints — these are among the findings in the State Audit Office’s (ÁSZ) report on the central bank’s foundations. According to László Windisch, president of the State Audit Office (ÁSZ), the MNB’s investment decisions were unprofessional and its reports unsuitable for effective oversight. The foundation, he said, failed to follow the required prudent investment policy.
Former MNB president György Matolcsy considers these reports completely unfounded. In the first episode of his podcast series, he said:
“Eighty percent of the State Audit Office’s findings are false, and twenty percent are untrue. The foundation was never in trouble — I’d be curious to know on what basis the president of the ÁSZ claims otherwise. The foundation managed its assets excellently; its value is far above the 266.4 billion-forint founding capital — over 500 billion. It was a uniquely long and oddly-styled investigation by one state institution into another; the whole process is almost incomprehensible. I hope it ends soon and the truth comes out.”
The State Audit Office responded with a single word: “Indeed.”
Windisch László stated that Matolcsy’s criminal liability had not been established but could not be ruled out either. He argued that since Matolcsy held no position in the foundations’ boards or supervisory bodies, nor in the investment companies or fund managers, any criminal acts would most likely have been committed by members of those bodies.
The scandal around the MNB erupted when the ÁSZ, following its audits of the Pallas Athéné Domus Meriti Foundation (PADME) and the Neumann János University Foundation, filed a complaint against unknown perpetrators on suspicion of asset-related and financial misconduct: of PADME’s 500 billion-forint assets, at least 150–200 billion may have been lost through poor or deliberately bad investment decisions.
According to the ÁSZ report, the MNB foundations’ asset manager, OPTIMA Zrt., hid public funds behind a complex network of companies and private equity funds. While hundreds of billions were lost on unprofitable stock market deals, companies linked to the former central bank governor’s family — including his son Ádám Matolcsy and his circle — conducted transactions that resulted in the creation of private wealth worth billions of forints.
“From a legal perspective, it’s not easy to determine what exactly happened around the MNB foundations. In the background, a complex and opaque political game is also being played,”
— explained legal sociologist Mátyás Bencze to Hírklikk.
“Regarding the foundations’ real-estate purchases, there’s debate even among professionals. Lawyers, economists, and public figures interpret the events differently.”
Transparency International Hungary had already bombarded the MNB with data requests back in April 2014 over suspicious, high-value art purchases, recalled Miklós Ligeti, the organization’s legal director.
“The MNB’s profit, as is well known, came from the conversion of foreign-currency loans into forints,” he explained.
“We issued a statement on October 2, 2014, warning that the 267 billion forint capitalization of the foundations amounted to a serious misappropriation of public funds. When the truth about where the money had gone was about to come out, they tried to classify it. That’s when Lajos Kósa made his infamous comment that the foundation’s money had ‘lost its public nature.’
Until 2020 the money — around 283 billion forints — still existed, mostly in government bonds. Then they bought shares in Globe Trade Center, a company listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, for about 200 billion, and also invested in a Swiss real-estate developer. Later, they borrowed 127.5 billion forints in bond form from the Neumann János University Foundation in Kecskemét.
We’re less interested in what these shares are worth now; what matters for determining legal liability is how much was paid for them at the time of purchase. The question is: how much was skimmed off during those transactions? The damage will only be recovered if at least part of the embezzled money can still be reclaimed.”
Is criminal prosecution realistic?
“The real question is whether there’s any political will to pursue it. It’s possible that a ‘no-go’ order has been issued, since it’s suspicious that after four or five months of investigation, the central bank’s leadership and those aware of these transactions haven’t even been questioned. From several sources, I know that the State Audit Office filed a complaint as early as January 22. We still haven’t received a response to our data request on this. A clear-cut crime was committed over nine years, yet proceedings have only just begun.”
Economist Péter Róna — formerly a member of the MNB’s Supervisory Board — noted that Windisch László, now head of the ÁSZ and formerly MNB vice-president, was directly involved in establishing these foundations. Róna recalled that at the board’s February 2014 meeting, he warned that the structure was conducive to clientelism and private enrichment.
According to him, the case won’t be resolved quickly:
“They’ll conclude that the foundations’ staff made poor decisions, and that the board members are responsible. It’s legally complex and will require a long investigation — years will pass, lawsuits will follow, and Matolcsy will likely walk free. Whether any asset loss occurred will ultimately be for the courts to decide.”
Former MNB president and economist Péter Ákos Bod added that while the central bank can legally create foundations consistent with the Central Bank Act, profit-oriented investment activity is forbidden. The owner — the Ministry of Finance — would have been justified in asking why profits belonging to the state budget were being diverted into investments.
He said the ÁSZ report also attempts to trace how money flowed from the central bank to the foundations, and through them to the operating companies.
“These companies then distributed funds through contracts — or worse, through investments — to private enterprises. To make matters worse, these businesses are personally linked to the MNB’s top leadership, so the threads tangle, extending abroad and into indirect ownership structures. The State Audit Office itself had to conclude that the transfers were intentionally made overly complex.”
Can it be proven that private wealth was created from central bank money?
“I don’t know. The State Audit Office has done its job, and the case is now under investigation. What’s clear, however, is that the governor’s family and close associates have become enormously wealthy.”
It seems the economic and political threads intertwine…
“The scale is striking: if hundreds of billions never reach the state budget and are siphoned off under the guise of central-bank independence, that can only happen if the owner tolerates it — or even encourages it. The bank’s profits couldn’t have been diverted without top-level political approval. The central bank’s financial position directly affects the state budget, which means the Ministry of Finance — and indeed the entire government and the prime minister — all bear responsibility.
It’s inconceivable that the creation and operation of a hundred-billion-forint foundation would go unnoticed by the owner. Either the oversight bodies failed, or they knowingly allowed this strange practice. We can now see that the MNB’s former leadership built an enormous and complex corporate network — what remains to be seen is the legal judgment, which will hopefully come in time.”
This article was produced with the financial support of the European Union. The views and opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA). Neither the European Union nor the EACEA can be held responsible for them.
