Georgia is currently experiencing a critical political period. Soon, parliamentary elections will take place, and referendum status will be granted. Recently, the West has been criticizing trends toward shifting policies accompanied by certain sanctions. The opposition plans to exploit this situation for their benefit and achieve power. At the same time, the government is confident in taking steps for the good of the country and is anticipating another victory.
In any case, we expect a very heated pre-election campaign, with the possibility of escalating tensions fueled by politically polarized forces and media outlets. At such times, disinformation becomes even more relevant and dangerous.
As technological advancements continue, the intentional or unintentional spread of false information in the vast ocean of data poses significant challenges. However, distinguishing between true and false information has become increasingly tricky, placing various segments of society under undue influence. The problem of disinformation is a headache for Georgia and the world, primarily as both external and internal forces work intensively in this area.
The significance of disinformation is underscored by the fact that Europe has explicitly urged Georgia to combat it. Among the nine conditions outlined for Georgia, a new stipulation focuses on fighting disinformation and foreign information manipulation in alignment with EU values.
On December 11, 2023, the Georgian government approved a draft decree titled “Government Communication Strategy for Georgia 2024-2027.” One of the strategy’s priority areas is combating disinformation and fake news. The document was developed with the participation of both Georgian representatives and international experts, including those from NATO and the EU information centers’ strategic communications teams.
For the First Time in History…
The seriousness with which Europe regards this issue is evidenced by, for the first time, experts at Davos labeled disinformation as the world’s primary problem. This assessment was based on a survey of 1,490 experts at the forum.
“Disinformation has quickly risen to the top over the past two years, and the risk is likely to intensify with elections upcoming in several countries,” the report states. Experts note that the dissemination of disinformation no longer requires specialized skills.
Sopo Gelava, an associate researcher at the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab (Digital Forensic Research Lab), told Fortune, “Social media platforms are primarily the channels through which disinformation spreads. They also utilize technical aspects, such as the creation of bot networks. Disinformants can be specific individuals, such as influencers with authority and credibility on certain topics. According to research, the share of information received from informal figures in various regions is remarkably high, potentially driven by specific local leaders.”
Vlad Barash, the scientific director of Graphika, emphasized that “the main challenge in combating disinformation lies in tracking the dissemination systems”:
“People ask: Who is spreading this? Answering that question is very difficult, partly because most disinformants tend to hide their tracks, making identification incredibly challenging. Close collaboration between governments, industry stakeholders, and the broader society is essential. Within this framework, addressing the issue of education at all levels is crucial.”
Disinformation in France and Germany Ahead of the Euro Elections
In the lead-up to the June European Parliament election, social media was inundated with disinformation across the EU. Analysts at the consulting firm Trollrensics examined potential networks of disinformation. The research was conducted in Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, investigating English words and hashtags related to the elections.
“We can confidently conclude that coordinated networks influenced the discourse on social media in Germany and France surrounding the EU elections,” the report states.
Trollrensics analyzed 2.3 million posts. The research revealed that the disinformation network was pervasive in Germany, facilitating the far-right party “Alternative for Germany” alongside anti-LGBT and anti-vaccine disinformation.
Meanwhile, the network in France had a significantly higher number of accounts than Germany’s.
According to the report, the disinformation campaign’s impact on political debates on Platform X was so significant that it became a trending topic through social media posts, comments, and likes.
In reality, the networks in France, Germany, and Italy were not specifically created to influence the EU elections. Many accounts were established in 2022 following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, while some were created even earlier. The report indicates that networks in France and Germany are expanding “at an incredible pace,” with new accounts continually emerging.
What is the Difference Between Georgian and European Disinformation?
Vano Chkikvadze, a political analyst and manager of the Open Society Foundation’s Eurointegration program, discussed the differences between Georgian and European disinformation in an interview with Fortuna:
“Disinformation is, of course, a significant problem both here and in the EU. It is a part of hybrid warfare. There are arguably two dimensions to consider: one that comes from outside and another that is created from within. In recent years, we have primarily seen this flow coming from abroad, particularly Russia, involving various topics such as human rights and projects financed by the West. However, in more recent times, we’ve been hearing instances of disinformation that are manufactured domestically – the so-called ‘globalist agenda’ that follows a principle of ‘boogeyman’ creation.
The difference between our context and that of Europe is that the government often nourishes this disinformation rather than being fought against it. This constitutes a stark contrast between our situation and any Western European country.”
Sopo Gelava further explains:
“There’s a term called media hygiene. Just as we wash our hands, we should be aware of how to behave on social media to avoid damaging ourselves or others. Combating disinformation requires more than just the efforts of a few NGOs; political-level initiatives must also be implemented in this regard. Media literacy is a mandatory subject in many countries, and critical analysis of information is taught from a very young age in many European nations.”
Football Served as a Tool for Disinformation
This year’s European Football Championship was held in Germany. Interested parties could not overlook such a significant event and tried to exploit it for their ends. Here are a few examples:
A photo circulated on social media showed a football fan dressed in Adolf Hitler’s uniform. Although this photo was spread on Facebook and X, it has no connection to this year’s championship. This is a photo from an October 2022 Halloween party in Madison, Wisconsin. It was aimed at one purpose: spreading hate.
Another false claim was made, accusing migrants of causing chaos after the matches. A video circulated on social media showed a square in Frankfurt filled with trash and empty food and drink containers. The video was posted with the caption: “I am not sure Frankfurt will endure the consequences of mass immigration for long.” It turned out that the video had nothing to do with migration, as it depicted the debris left behind after the England vs. Denmark match on June 20.
Election Disinformation
The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated that misinformation and disinformation spread across borders. In some cases, false information is adapted for a new audience. However, we often see the successful repetition of proven disinformation tactics. Those who create disinformation likely operate on the principle that if a strategy works, they will reuse it.
The coalition LatamChequea, a network of fact-checking specialists from Latin America, Spain, Portugal, and the USA, decided to analyze whether there are common patterns in the spread of election-related disinformation across different countries. They discovered that at least ten types of disinformation reoccurred in all Latin American countries over the past three years and during the 2020 elections in the USA.
Below are ten commonly encountered types of pre-election disinformation that you are likely to encounter on social media or the websites of organizations camouflaged as legitimate media outlets:
- Misinterpretation of certain violations in the electoral process that do not equate to fraud.
- Allegations of coordinated possible fraud by officials.
- Claims that deceased individuals cast votes.
- Spread of disinformation suggesting that people who are not eligible to vote are casting ballots.
- Manipulations aimed at persuading individuals to abstain from voting or to nullify votes.
- Disinformation regarding necessary documentation for voting.
- Disinformation about citizens voting from abroad.
- Creation of chaos on election day.
- Fabrication of false exit polls.
- Falsifying candidates’ statements.
What Should Individuals Do?
Sopo Gelava advises:
“First, we should pay attention to our emotions and how we react to this information. If you notice that you are agitated or anxious and that it provokes strong emotions, take a moment to pause, reflect, and try to critically assess why this particular piece of information has elicited such a reaction in you. Second, ask yourself: what interests may be behind disseminating this information? Third, verify and cross-check across various sources and extract key content. If verification isn’t possible, at the very least, refrain from contributing to its spread and do not share false information.”
Isabella Wilkinson (Senior Researcher and chair of Strategic Initiatives for Digital Society) described 2024 as a “perfect storm for the spread of propaganda and threats.”
“We see how state and non-state actors are increasingly intent on using information warfare for their interests. We are already discussing a potential threat to society as a whole. It is time to develop a comprehensive strategy combining policy, regulation, media, security, technology, and industry to combat disinformation.”
Sopo Gelava also believes that there is still room and resources to plan effective campaigns that adequately inform the public about the harmful effects of disinformation and how to protect themselves from it. Regarding the media environment, as a DFRLab researcher notes, today’s “media landscape is polarized and bipolar. Therefore, it is crucial for individuals to develop critical thinking skills, as each of our choices today determines what type of information we consume.”
Where Does Disinformation Come From?
The term disinformation originates from Russia, specifically from the Soviet Union, when the KGB (Committee for State Security of the USSR) established a department dedicated to disinformation. Its goal was to gather information on local sentiments and discussions through resident agents embedded in various countries and create some disinformation based on reality.
Successful disinformation must be grounded in certain realities to capture public interest and yield specific successes. If disinformation does not relate to topics of public concern, it typically remains ignored and has no impact.
